



Source: Refinitiv

Market data	
EPIC/TKR	VTA.NA, VTA.LN
	VTAS LN
Price (€)	5.12/5.23/436p
12m high (€)	5.54/6.30/536p
12m low (€)	4.55/4.60/400p
Shares (m)	36.6
Mkt cap (€m)	187
2023E div. yield	12.2%
Latest NAV (Nov'22	2, €) 6.01
Discount to NAV	-15%
Country of listing	NL/UK
Currency of listing	€/€/GBP
Market	AEX, LSE

#### Description

Volta is a closed-ended, limited liability investment company that aims to provide a steady stream of quarterly dividends, pursuing exposure, predominantly, to Collateralised Loan Obligations (CLOs) and similar asset classes.

#### Company information

Ind. Chairman	Dagmar Kent
	Kershaw
Independent	Graham Harrison,
Non-Executive	Stephen Le Page,
Directors	Yedau Ogundele
Fund Managers	Serge Demay,
(AXA IM Paris)	A Martin-Min,
	François Touati
Co. sec./	BNP Paribas
Administrator	Securities Services
	SCA, Guernsey

	,	,
Wehsite	www.voltafinance	com

Key shareholders (Jul'22)	
AXA Group	30%
BNP WM	16%
BNP Sec. Serv.	11%

Diary	
Mid-Jan	Dec estimated NAV

#### Analyst

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## **VOLTA FINANCE LIMITED**

#### R&A shining light on 20%+ IRR base-case scenarios

In our note, <u>Cash is king and the king is rocking and rolling</u>, published on 16 September 2022, we examined Volta's success in generating cashflows at near-record levels, and looked forward, considering why defaults would rise – but not to the level then built into loan prices. We also highlighted Volta's diversification and geographical exposure. These positive underlying features continue, and we briefly update them in this note. We also consider how investors can use the recent Report and Account (R&A) disclosure to better understand the true business drivers and that Volta's mark-to-market accounting creates volatility around these positive fundamentals.

- ▶ Strong current position: Current cash receipts are 21.8% of NAV, reflecting low defaults (strong corporate cashflows and profitability, ability to pass on inflation to date), CLOs having low locked-in borrowing costs, CLO floating rate investments and Volta's portfolio positioning over recent years into CLO equity.
- ▶ Resilience going forward: The rating agency's/Volta's/our confidence in a relatively low expected level of defaults reflects i) a strong starting position, including high cash cushions in CLO structures, ii) a preponderance of PE, iii) inflation still being friend, not foe, iv) covenant-lite documentation, and v) Volta's diversification.
- ▶ Valuation: Volta trades at a double discount: its share price is at a 15% discount to NAV, and we believe its mark-to-market (MTM) NAV still includes a further sentiment-driven discount to the present value of expected cashflows. Volta targets an 8% of NAV dividend (11.5% 2023E yield on current share price).
- ▶ **Risks:** Credit risk is a key sensitivity. We examined the valuation of assets, highlighting the multiple controls to ensure its validity, in our *initiation note*, in September 2018. The NAV is exposed to sentiment towards its own and underlying markets. Volta's long \$ position is only partially hedged.
- ▶ Investment summary: Volta is an investment for sophisticated investors, as there could be sentiment-driven share price volatility. Long-term returns have been 7.3% p.a. (dividend re-invested basis) since initiation. With above-average returns on recent re-investments, the portfolio's past six-month cashflow (annualised) yield is 21.8%. We estimate near 2x 2024 dividend cover.

Financial summary and valuation (Hardman & Co adjusted basis)										
Year-end Jul (€m)	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023E	2024E				
Coupons & dividends	42.0	39.4	41.8	42.9	47.1	51.6				
Operating income	41.0	31.5	44.5	41.6	45.4	49.9				
Inv. mgr.'s fees (stat.)	(4.2)	(3.9)	(14.2)	(3.9)	(8.2)	(9.1)				
Other expenses	(1.0)	(1.0)	(1.0)	(1.0)	(1.0)	(1.0)				
Prof. & tot. comp. inc.	32.9	25.8	35.2	33.4	36.2	39.8				
Statutory PTP	7.1	(63.0)	76.8	(17.8)	37.5	41.2				
Underlying EPS (€)	0.9	0.7	1.0	0.9	1.0	1.1				
NAV per share (€)	7.9	5.7	7.3	6.2	6.7	7.2				
S/P prem./disc. (-) to NAV*	12%	23%	17%	-16%	-23%	-27%				
Gearing	12%	0%	0%	0%	21%	19%				
Dividend (€)	0.62	0.52	0.52	0.61	0.59	0.61				
Dividend yield	12.1%	10.2%	10.2%	11.9%	11.5%	11.8%				

\*2017-22 actual NAV and s/p, 2023-4E NAV to current s/p; Source: Hardman & Co Research



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
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# Update on strong and resilient cashflows very strong

## Recent history of rising Volta cashflows

In six months to November 2022, annualised cash receipts were 21.8% of NAV and 2.7x the dividend payout ratio The chart below shows the annualised interest and coupon cashflow receipts received by Volta in 2022. The figures take the annualised rate for the previous six months' receipts to smooth out short-term timing effects. The latest figure is 21.8%, against a target dividend payout ratio of 8% of NAV. This shows not only that the dividend is very well-covered, but that, on a cash-only basis, NAV growth may be expected. Historically, in non-crisis years, a yield of ca.12%-13% through the cycle would be considered more normal.



Source: Volta monthly reports, Hardman & co Research

#### How has this been achieved?

Achieved by Axa asset allocation and increased CLO equity income, driven by both CLO revenue and low default rates

In our note, <u>Cash is king and the king is rocking and rolling</u>, we detailed how this had been achieved. In summary, the rise in Volta's income reflects both management actions and market conditions, including i) increased allocation to CLO equity at a time when CLO equity cashflows were helped by re-fi and re-sets, and also benefited from the low default rates among underlying borrowers, ii) most underlying loans are floating rate, and so benefited from rising \$ rates, iii) to date, inflation has been a friend, not a foe, for Volta, with borrowers able to pass on cost increases to customers and seeing the capital value of debt erode, and iv) rising reinvestment yields.



Defaults will rise

In latest factsheet, management forecasts increase will still be to just 2%-3%, which is well below level implied in NAV

Additional resilience factors to consider include actions by CLO managers...

...preponderance of PE backers and cov-lite documentation...

...and Volta's own risk mitigation

We assume high-teen IRR on re-investment, against normal 12%-13%

#### Resilience of future cashflows

Looking at the past/current cashflows is of little value if future cashflows collapse. In September, we wrote "Increases in defaults from their current low levels appear a certainty, and so the critical judgment call is by how much they rise and when", and cited an August 2022 S&P report expecting speculative-grade European corporate defaults to reach just 3% in June 2023 (from 1.1% June 2022), with lower levels in the US. Even its downside scenario has only a 5% default scenario for Europe. We also noted stress tests by other rating agencies drawing similar conclusions.

In its <u>November factsheet</u>, Volta reported "In terms of default rates, we have been, for the-last-12-month measure, at 0.4% default rate for European loans and 0.7% for US loans.... Rating agencies currently forecast default rates between 4% and 5.5% for 2023. Our default rates view for 2023 still lands in the 2% to 3% area for both US and European loans". The latter reflects the fact that, historically, the manager has consistently selected market-beating investments, and so may reasonably expect to have a below-market default experience. We conclude that there has been a slight deterioration in expectations over the past quarter, but it is not material, and the default expectation built into loan prices continues to be materially above the level built into the market expectation of the rating agencies. Volta's better-than-market credit performance is an additional buffer.

#### Additional resilience buffers

As we commented in our last report, it is worth noting that there are multiple market and Volta-specific additional resilience buffers, including i) CLO managers have been preparing for worsening conditions by using the recent strong cashflows to build cash cushions within the CLO structures, ii) the growing importance of well-financed, PE-backed corporates reduces the probability of default and likely loss in the event of default, iii) cov-lite documentation will delay default events and, critically, may reduce the chances of them happening at all, and iv) Volta-specific buffers, such as its diversification (with a current portfolio of more than 1,400 underlying names), its geographical mix in higher-growth, advanced economies and with less exposure to downside risk, and a portfolio management with a proven track record of no diversion of cashflows through COVID-19 and a performance in cohorts ahead of peers in the GFC.

#### Re-investment opportunities

In a period of market disruption, the potential for mis-pricing anomalies rises. There is likely to be not only indiscriminate treatment of borrowers but also of CLO structures and, additionally, CLO managers – thus potentially giving AXA a triple opportunity for long-term gains. The reason that Volta MTMs its book is that it does not commit to holding positions to a maturity. It has the flexibility to take whatever opportunity offers the optimal returns at any given time, and it will trade positions to achieve this. In the current market, we expect IRRs in the high teens, rather than the long-term 12%-13%, and for these investments to be locked in for a couple of years (our model now assumes 17%-18%). Our re-investment rate is thus slightly below the assumed returns being earned on the existing book.



## Lessons from the R&A

We highlight the business sections from the <u>July 2022 Report and Accounts</u> (released at the end of October) to illustrate for investors the key drivers affecting Volta and its outlook

## The scenario tests (p6-7)

Volta has provided three scenarios:

- ▶ Base case: an overnight 2% increase in the CCC bucket. On average, for all positions (mixing USD and EUR positions), this would cause a 2.3% default rate every year for the next three years.
- ▶ Stress 1: an overnight 4% increase in the CCC bucket (some CLOs will then exceed the classic 7.5% authorised CCC bucket). On average, for all positions (mixing USD and EUR positions), this would cause a 3.8% default rate every year for the next three years.
- ▶ Stress 2: an overnight 7% increase in the CCC bucket (all CLOs will then exceed the classic 7.5% authorised CCC bucket). On average, for all positions (mixing USD and EUR positions), this would cause a 5.8% default rate every year for the next three years.

The results of the stress tests were projected NAV yields on CLO positions of i) base case 25%, ii) stress 1 23%, and iii) stress 2 17%. CLOs accounted for 83% of the trust's November 2022 total NAV, and, over time, this is expected to rise.

# Management comment on defaults (p4-6)

Management devotes considerable space to the default outlook, including its own views, those of Moodys and those of Morgan Stanley Research. Many of the resilience issues we highlighted above, and in our previous reports, are consistent with these views. The wording from the M&A is given below:

"As at the end of August 2022, the last-12-month default rates were respectively 0.6% and 0.7% for US and European Loans. To put this in perspective, the average annual default rate for the last decade was around 2.8%: as such, we are still in a low default rate environment.

Nonetheless, we expect default rates to reach circa 2% for US loans and 3% for European loans in 2023. We do not expect default rates to increase significantly more than that for several reasons:

- Inflation is eroding debt and favouring debt refinancing;
- There are billions available in PE funds to support companies issuing loans;
- Real interest rates are still very negative;
- Companies are still cash rich and EBITDA/profitability is still (at the time of writing this comment) far above normal standards;
- Most loans were refinanced in 2021 hence the maturity wall for US and European loans is in 2028/29; and

In Volta's view, "We must consider very punitive assumptions to fall below 20% projected IRR"...

...12-13% would be considered a normal year

Management detailed number of factors driving limited increase in expected defaults in 2023




- More than 90% of the loans are covenant-light loans, a temporary stress in Interest Coverage or in Leverage do not cause a default per se."

Main re-balancing has been part of European exposure from CLO equity to debt to be more defensive...

...while continuing to increase overall CLO weighting

### Portfolio re-balancing

The main book adjustment in FY'22 consisted in repositioning part of the European exposure from CLO equity to CLO debt in order to gain a more defensive position in Europe, while constantly decreasing non-CLO positions. The strategic rationale for simplifying the portfolio was outlined on our note, <u>Simple Simon Says</u>, published on 30 November 2021. As can be seen in the chart below, CLOs now represent the highest proportion of assets experienced in recent years.



Source: Volta Report and Accounts and factsheets, Hardman & Co Research

Volta continues to prefer USD CLO debt relative to EUR CLO debt, as US Ioan portfolios are more diversified and liquid, so that, on a long-term basis, USD CLO debt tends to be of a higher quality than EUR CLO debt. Since the end of May 2022, when US 10-year government bonds reached ca.3%, they have been adding some duration to the portfolio using futures and options on T-Notes.

# Mark-to-market vs. mark-to-model

In our view, it is worth talking a step back and remembering that the purpose of the trust is to identify where the market is mis-pricing cashflows. With Volta looking at the fundamentals of cash first, this will, at times, cause a "tension" with the market in valuing the existing portfolio, as the latter's prices are also driven by sentiment and liquidity factors. While this is good for taking new positions, it means that, for a time, existing holdings are highly likely to show a divergence between what the manager feels their likely value is (driven by the expected present value of cashflows) and the market creating a volatile NAV.

The chart below reflects the NAV total for Volta (mark-to-market) and its peer, Blackstone Loan Financing (BGLF, mark-to-model). In nine of the eleven months in 2022, the two trusts generated the same directional performance (i.e. positive or negative), but Volta has delivered a greater performance than BGLF. On average, Volta's monthly performance has been 3.5x the size of BGLF's – so, in down months, it has fallen more, and, in up months, it has recovered by a greater amount. We do not find this variance between trusts in the same area surprising, as it reflects the fact that sentiment exaggerates fundamentals. The one that uses an accounting NAV, which includes sentiment, will be more volatile than the one that is based off models.

As objective is to identify when market has mispriced cashflows, there will be times when using MTM creates volatility in Volta's own NAV

Volta's monthly performance, on average, 3.5x as volatile as that of BGLF, reflecting mark-to-market vs. mark-to-model



Monthly total NAV return (%)											
	Jan-22	Feb-22	Mar-22	Apr-22	May-22	Jun-22	Jul-22	Aug-22	Sep-22	Oct-22	Nov-22
VTA	1.7	(3.9)	1.5	2.3	(11.8)	(4.6)	4.5	2.8	(7.2)	(2.6)	6.3
BGLF	1.2	0.5	3.5	0.4	(1.7)	(2.1)	1.9	1.4	(1.8)	(0.6)	2.1
Difference	0.5	(4.4)	(2.0)	1.9	(10.1)	(2.5)	2.6	1.4	(5.4)	(2.0)	4.2
VTA as % BGLF	139%	n/a	43%	523%	694%	219%	237%	200%	400%	433%	297%

Source: Volta Blackstone Loan Financing monthly factsheets, Hardman & Co Research

Accounting rule clear – if Volta wants the flexibility to optimise returns by trading assets, it has to mark to market

In reality, very unlikely to ever be a forced seller at distressed prices...

... as such, as a going concern, in our view, its "real" NAV is more likely to be modelled valuation

In terms of which is the "right" approach, the accounting rules are clear. Looking through the terminology, unless there is a clear intention to hold the asset to maturity, it should be marked to market. As Axa wants to keep the flexibility to optimise returns by trading assets, under the rules, it has to use the MTM approach. To change the policy and hold assets to maturity, just to meet accounting rules, would, in our view, be the tail wagging the dog – and the wrong approach.

In terms of which is the "real" valuation:

- ▶ If the trust were in a position of poor liquidity, and so forced to sell assets, then the current market price would be relevant. However, for illiquid assets, such as CLOs, one could argue that even a market price might not be realisable.
- We would also argue that it would be extremely disappointing (and very unexpected) if Volta were ever to get into the position of being forced to sell assets at distressed prices. We have reviewed its liquidity management in previous reports, noting that i) at November 2022, it had cash balances of €18m and no debt, ii) cash generation is very strong (currently ca.22% NAV annualised), iii) derivative usage, and so potential margin calls, are very modest (under 1% NAV at last R&A), and iv) currency exposure is not hedged so there are no cash calls associated with this. If Volta is unlikely to be a forced seller of assets at distressed prices, but rather can hold them until a more reasonable price is achievable, there is a strong argument that the present value of modelled cashflows gives a much fairer view of the realisable value of assets as a going concern.

As Volta and BGLF use different approaches to valuation, a comparison is more of a challenge. We would argue that, when the market has been risk-averse (as it is at present), sentiment is likely to have adversely affected Volta's NAV to a greater extent than BGLF. Accordingly, investors should expect the latter to trade at a greater discount to NAV than Volta.



# **Valuation**

Given the historical performance, risk profile and portfolio mixes identified in previous reports, Volta's discount to NAV appears anomalous.



Source: Hardman & Co Research, Monthly reports for Volta (VTA), TwentyFour Income Fund (TFIF), Fair Oaks Income Fund (FAIR), Blackstone/GCO Loan Financing Ltd (BGLF) and Marble Point Loan Financing (MPLF); priced 11 January 2023



# **Financials**

After discussion with management, we have removed the gearing through Repos from both our 2023 and 2024 forecasts, reducing the balance sheet, income and interest expenses lines. This reflects management's risk appetite. The net effects this year are modest, with a more noticeable impact next (NAV -€0.17).

Profit and loss account (statutory)									
Year-end Jul (€m)	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023E	2024E
Coupons and dividends received	34.7	33.2	38.5	42.0	39.4	41.8	42.9	45.0	42.6
Net gains on sales	2.7	3.1	0.0	0.5	(7.0)	2.7	(1.3)	-	-
Unrealised gains and losses	(18.5)	4.7	(5.7)	(18.2)	(87.9)	47.1	(46.3)	1.5	1.5
Net gain on fin. assets at FV through P&L	18.9	40.9	32.7	24.4	(55.5)	91.6	(4.7)	46.5	44.1
Net FX	0.3	5.6	(2.0)	(11.6)	(1.4)	0.9	(8.6)	-	-
Net gain on IR derivatives	0.0	0.4	(0.9)	1.6	0.0	(0.3)	0.5	-	-
Interest expense on repo	(0.9)	(1.1)	(1.4)	(1.6)	(0.8)	0.0-	-	-	-
Net bank int. & charges	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	0.1	0.0	(O.O)	(O.O)	(O.O)	(0.0)
Operating income	18.2	45.7	28.4	12.8	(57.7)	92.1	(12.8)	46.4	44.0
Inv. manager's fees	(4.1)	(4.1)	(4.2)	(4.2)	(3.9)	(3.3)	(3.9)	(3.4)	(3.6)
Inv. manager's performance fees	0.0	(1.5)	0.0	0.0	0.0	(10.9)	-	(4.7)	(4.0)
Directors' remuneration & expenses	(0.6)	(0.5)	(0.5)	(0.5)	(0.5)	(0.3)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.4)
Other expenses	(0.9)	(0.8)	(1.0)	(1.0)	(0.9)	(0.8)	(0.8)	(8.0)	(0.8)
Total expenses	(5.6)	(6.9)	(5.7)	(5.7)	(5.3)	(15.3)	(5.1)	(9.3)	(8.8)
Profit and total comp. income	12.6	38.7	22.7	7.1	(63.0)	76.8	(17.8)	37.1	35.3
Avg. no shares for EPS calculation (m)	36.5	36.5	36.56	36.59	36.61	36.61	36.61	36.61	36.61
Statutory EPS (€)	0.34	1.06	0.62	0.19	-1.72	2.10	-0.49	1.01	0.96
Total dividend (€)	0.62	0.62	0.62	0.62	0.52	0.52	0.61	0.59	0.61

Source: Volta, Hardman & Co Research

## Adjusted profit and loss

To derive our adjusted profit and loss, we strip out the capital movements, including i) unrealised gains/losses, ii) FX movements, and iii) net gains of IR derivatives. We have left in realised gains, which, although volatile, have been converted into cash, and some capital gains may be expected to form part of the normal course of business. We have also backdated the current management fee structure, and adjusted it to the new level of profitability.

Hardman & Co adjusted profit and loss account									
Year-end Jul (€m)	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023E	2024E
Coupons and dividends received	34.7	33.2	38.5	42.0	39.4	41.8	42.9	45.0	42.6
Net gains on sales	2.7	3.1	0.0	0.5	(7.0)	2.7	(1.3)	-	-
Net gain on fin. assets at FV through P/L	37.4	36.2	38.5	42.5	32.4	44.5	41.7	45.0	42.6
Interest expense on repo	(0.9)	(1.1)	(1.4)	(1.6)	(0.8)	-	-	-	-
Net bank interest & charges	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	0.1	0.0	(O.O)	(O.O)	(O.O)	(O.O)
Operating income	36.5	35.0	37.0	41.0	31.5	44.5	41.6	44.9	42.5
Inv. manager's fees	(4.3)	(4.6)	(4.6)	(4.4)	(3.6)	(3.3)	(3.9)	(3.4)	(3.6)
Inv. manager's performance fees	(1.3)	(1.2)	(1.3)	(2.1)	(0.6)	(4.6)	(3.0)	(4.4)	(3.6)
Directors' remuneration & expenses	(0.6)	(0.5)	(0.5)	(0.5)	(0.5)	(0.3)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.4)
Other expenses	(0.9)	(0.8)	(0.9)	(1.0)	(1.0)	(1.0)	(1.0)	(1.0)	(1.0)
Total expenses	(7.2)	(7.0)	(7.3)	(8.0)	(5.7)	(9.3)	(8.3)	(9.2)	(8.6)
Profit and total comp. income	29.3	28.0	29.7	32.9	25.8	35.2	33.4	35.8	33.9
Adjusted EPS (€)	0.80	0.77	0.81	0.90	0.71	0.96	0.91	0.98	0.93
Dividend cover (x)	1.29	1.24	1.31	1.45	1.36	1.85	1.49	1.66	1.53

Source: Volta, Hardman & Co Research



# Balance sheet and cashflow

Balance sheet									
@ 31 Jul (€m)	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023E	2024E
Financial assets at FV through P&L	324.1	321.3	325.7	325.5	201.7	259.0	214.1	236.5	259.7
Derivatives	1.2	0.7	1.3	0.8	2.8	2.8	3.0	3.0	3.0
Trade and other receivables	5.0	0.3	12.9	5.5	0.0	2.5	0.1	0.1	0.1
Cash and cash equivalents	10.9	37.1	20.5	14.5	9.7	18.2	16.8	19.1	9.0
Total assets	341.3	359.4	360.4	346.2	214.2	282.6	242.9	258.7	271.8
Loan financing under repos	40.3	38.1	42.7	35.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Interest payable on loan financing	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.2
Derivatives	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.3	2.8	1.4	9.3	9.3	9.3
Trade and other payables	11.6	15.6	11.7	19.2	3.2	14.9	5.9	5.9	5.9
Total liabilities	52.0	53.8	54.7	55.7	6.0	16.3	15.3	15.5	15.5
Net assets	289.3	305.5	305.7	290.6	208.2	266.3	227.6	243.2	256.4
Period-end no. shares (m)	36.5	36.5	36.6	36.6	36.6	36.6	36.6	36.6	36.6
NAV per share (€)	7.92	8.36	8.36	7.94	5.69	7.28	6.22	6.65	7.01
Total debt to NAV	12%	12%	14%	12%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%

Source: Volta, Hardman & Co Research

Cashflow									
Year-end Jul (€m)	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023E	2024E
Total comprehensive income	12.6	38.7	22.7	7.1	-63.0	76.8	(17.8)	37.1	35.3
Net gain on financial assets at FV in P&L	(18.9)	(40.9)	(32.7)	(24.4)	55.5	(91.6)	4.7	(46.5)	(44.1)
Net movm't. in unreal. gain on reval. derivs.	(1.5)	0.5	(0.5)	0.7	0.6	(1.5)	8.6	0.3	0.3
Interest expense on repos	0.9	1.1	1.4	1.6	0.8	0.0	(0.5)	-	-
FX losses on re-translation repos	(0.3)	(2.2)	0.4	2.0	0.9	0.0	-	-	-
(Increase)/decrease in trade receivables	0.0	(0.1)	0.1	(3.2)	3.2	0.0	(0.0)	-	-
Increase/(decrease) in trade payables	(1.5)	1.6	(1.7)	0.1	(0.3)	10.7	(10.5)	-	-
Directors'/other fees paid in cash	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Net cash inflow/(outflow) from op. acts.	(8.5)	(1.0)	(10.3)	(15.9)	(2.4)	(5.6)	28.7	35.9	34.1
Cashflow from investing activities							-	-	-
Coupons and dividends received	33.6	34.4	38.0	42.2	39.9	40.4	44.3	45.0	42.6
Purchase of financial assets	(127.0)	(109.0)	(138.8)	(117.8)	(68.1)	(36.8)	(51.2)	(130.0)	(140.0)
Proceeds from sales of financial assets	84.9	125.5	114.2	118.2	83.0	29.1	51.3	118.0	118.0
Net cash inflow/outflow from invest. acts.	(8.5)	50.9	13.4	42.7	54.8	32.7	(9.2)	(12.0)	(22.0)
Cashflows from financing activities							_	_	_
Dividends paid	(22.6)	(22.7)	(22.7)	(22.3)	(19.4)	(18.7)	(20.9)	(21.5)	(22.2)
Proceeds from repos	13.3	0.0	4.2	(8.8)	(36.8)	0.0	-	-	-
Interest paid on repos	(0.8)	(1.1)	(1.3)	(1.7)	(1.0)	0.0	-	-	-
Net cash inflow from financing activities	(10.2)	(23.7)	(19.7)	(32.8)	(57.2)	(18.7)	(20.9)	(21.5)	(22.2)
Net increase in cash and cash equivalents	(27.2)	26.2	(16.6)	(6.0)	(4.8)	8.5	(1.4)	2.4	(10.1)
Opening cash and cash equivalents	38.1	10.9	37.1	20.5	14.5	9.7	18.2	16.8	19.1
Closing cash and cash equivalents	10.9	37.1	20.5	14.5	9.7	18.2	16.8	19.1	9.0

Source: Volta, Hardman & Co Research



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